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Abstract 
Regulators impose price limits on daily price movements to protect investors from 
excessive volatility, but several empirical studies have cast serious doubt on the 
benefits of such mechanisms. Using a large cross-sectional sample combined with 
intraday data from the Tokyo Stock Exchange, this study finds evidence that 
partially supports conventional criticisms that price limits spread out volatility, 
delay price discovery, and interrupt trading activities. More importantly, the 
transaction data analysis reveals that price limits help to reduce order imbalance 
and improve information asymmetry, justifying the existence of price limits on the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
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1. Introduction 
As one of the commonly used market circuit breakers, price limits are used by many 
securities markets to protect investors from excessive volatility while restricting daily 
price movements to within a certain range1• There is, however, controversy on price 
limit performance, which remains unsettled. This study examines the value of price 
limits, by performing an extensive investigation on the Tokyo Stock Exchange based 
on a sample pool constructed from intraday and daily data. We find price limits 
I 
improve order imbalance in the post limit-hit period and, also, that no particular magnet 
effect occurs on stocks whose prices hit the limits. Furthennore, we find that the market 
absorbs one-side orders, while price limits provide cooling-off periods for alleviating 
information asymmetry in the market. Combining these results with our tests on daily 
data, we also conclude that price limits can mitigate the volati lity caused by 
uninformed trading, although we find that price limits delay fundamenta l volatility by 
temporarily controlling the daily price variation. 
The important motivation for adopting price limits, is to calm fanatic trading during 
turbulent periods in stock markets; such as 1987 Black Monday, the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis and the 2000 Dot-com mania. Price limits halt trading activities when a 
pre-specified price boundary is exceeded, but sti ll allow trading between the boundaries 
1 In general, policy makers use circuit breakers to limit trading activities. These circuit breakers include price limits, 
trading halts, transaction taJCes, collars, margin requirements and position limits. Stock exchanges that use price 
limits are those in Athens, Taiwan, Japan, China, Malaysia, Thailand, India, Korea and Paris, among others. Wide 
diffe rences in percentages on price limits exist among the exchanges listed, from approximately 3.5% to 30% and, at 
times, even higher. 
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to continue. Regulators revise the limits when their perceptions of the market, or the 
macroeconomic environment change2. Also, advocators suggest that if excessive 
volatility is a result of uninformed trading, price limits provide uninformed traders with 
more time to reassess asset value and rationalise the estimation of new equilibrium 
prices before continuing their trades. An imperfect market suffers the problem of 
limited capacity when facing volume shocks, where informed value traders are 
concerned about price adjustments during the intervals between the time when an order 
is decided, submitted and executed. In this circumstance the benefit of price limits also 
comes from reducing the implementation risk caused by the massive volume, which 
encourages info1med value traders to enter the market. (Greenwald and Stein, 1991; 
Kodres and O'Brien, 1994) 
Nevertheless, early studies have raised criticisms regarding the relationships of price 
limit, volatility and market efficiency. Kyle (1988) and Fama (1989) both argue that 
circuit breakers stop prices from being adjusted promptly when fundamental values 
change greatly. Therefore, instead of mitigating large price fluctuations, price limits 
may induce a volatility spill-over. Furthermore, Fama (1989) points out that rational 
prices are not necessarily less volatile than irrational prices, and prevailing prices on 
the market may not reflect all the available information with the imposition of price 
limits. Thus, price limits may delay price discovery and reduce market efficiency in 
semi-strong form. Another proposition related to market efficiency is that the trading 
2 For example: Lhe Stock Exchange of Thailand increased price limits from 10% to 30% in December 1997; and Lhe 
Korean Stock Exchange has raised price limits from 4.6% to 15% in four steps since 1995. 
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process is interfered with when trades at prices outside the pre-assigned ranges are 
prohibited. The argument that price limits could reduce noise trading and achieve lower 
information asymmetry faces the criticism that equilibrium price can only be realised 
during continuous trading (Amihud and Mendelson, 1991; Gerety and Mulherin, 1992). 
Although French and Roll (1986) contend that the degree of information asymmetry is 
positively related to uninformed trading (noise) in the market, they also suggest it is 
more likely for private information to induce price variation when the market is open. 
Therefore, price limits possibly hold back rational trading from informed traders, 
however price limits do not stop the noise trading that increases transitory volatility 
(Harris 1998). 
Based on the above discussions, most of the empirical studies on the impact of price 
limits on market economies show that price limits do not meet regulators ' expectations 
on controlling volatility, but instead impose inefficiency issues on securities markets. 
For example, Kim and Rhee (1997) confirm volatility spill-over, delayed price 
discovery and trading interference hypotheses on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). 
The studies of Chung (1991) on the Korean stock market and Chen (1993) on the 
Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE) show that price limits do not bring significant benefit 
to markets. Nevertheless, most studies only look at the impact of price limits on total 
volatility, instead of separating transitory and fundamental volatility. It would be 
premature to draw conclusions on whether price limits are always bad for markets 
without further studying how informed decisions are affected (Harris, 1998). 
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Our study contributes to the existing literature by shedding light on the influence of 
price limits on intraday trading activities and the information content of prices. Chan, 
Kim, and Rhee (2005) conclude that price limits do not improve the price formation 
process and exacerbate order imbalance, based on the intraday data of the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE). Nevertheless, the sample size for their paper is fairly 
small, with only upper limit-hit events included3, which limits the applicability of their 
results . As a matter of fact , both regulators and investors are concerned with lower 
limit-hit events , as much as, if not more so, than they are concerned with upper events. 
This is because the large decrement on stock price often induces market panic, and also 
greatly affects rational investment decisions. Using transaction data of stocks that were 
actively traded on the TSE from 1999 to 2000, we test how price limits affect intraday 
activities, as well as the degree of information asymmetry; which is an important factor 
for maintaining equilibrium spread in an order-driven market (Harris, 2003). 
This paper also fills a gap in the literature by conducting a recent investigation of price 
limit performance on volatility, price behaviours and trading volumes in the TSE 
during the last decade (1996 to 2005). The most recent study on TSE price limits (Kim 
and Rhee, 1997) uses a sample period of 1989 to 1992. It is necessary to re-examine 
this market and provide research which is more relevant to current regulators, as the 
economic environment of the stock market in Japan has changed since the Big Bang 
3 In Chan et al. (2005), only ninety-eight sample events with prices hitting upper limit (+30%) are included in the 
testing procedure, with six events with prices hitting lower limits being excluded from their tests. 
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reform4 . The TSE also presents a very good platform, with sufficient sample magnitude 
and various price limit ranges, hence the test result can be more persuasive with lower 
bias. Compared with other major exchanges, the market liquidity in the TSE is mostly 
provided by limit-order traders, with no designated dealer or market maker. TSE also 
distinguishes itself with its elaborate market microstructure, including special quotes, 
maximum price variation rule and price limits. Thus, it is interesting to seek how price 
limits affect market efficiency and protect uninformed traders in this much regulated, 
but" ... well-functioning financial market" (Lehmann and Modest, 1994, p. 982). 
Our three findings on the daily data during the past decade are summarised below. 
Firstly, the volatility spill-over effect not only occurs with limit-hitting stocks, but also 
with stocks where the changes in price are within 90% of the limits. This result 
suggests that volatility spill-over may not be solely attributed to price limits . Secondly, 
price continuation occurs more frequently in stocks which hit the limits in previous 
trading days, especially when upper price limits are hit, which implies a delayed 
price-discovery effect . We find investors' under-reaction (momentum strategy) 
partially contributes to price continuation when the price is moving upward. Following 
the methodology of Kim and Sweeney (2002), however, our sample data does not lend 
support to the proposition that informed traders are inclined to delay trades after price 
limits are hit. Thirdly, the trading volume of stocks with prices hitting limits, decreases 
at a lower speed in comparison with other stocks which also experience large price 
4 After the rise and collapse of the economic bubble around 1990, a financial system reform was initiated in Japan in 
o rder to revitalise Japan's financial market. This reform, which has been in place since late 1996, is also known as 
the Japanese Big Bang. 
variations without hitting limits. Unsurprisingly, these daily results confirm our 
findings based on transaction data about improved order imbalance and information 
asymmetry in the post limit-hit period. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. The next section lays out institutional 
background information about the TSE, and then describes the sample data, our data 
filtering process, and the summary stati stics of the sample. Section 3 outlines our 
empirical designs and presents the findings on the test of order imbalance and 
information asymmetry hypotheses on transaction data. In Section 4, three hypotheses 
are tested on daily data; volatility spill-over, delayed price discovery, and trading 
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inte1ference. Conclusions and future research suggestions are summarised in Section 5. 
2. Tokyo Stock Exchange and Descriptions of Sample Data 
2.1 Tokyo Stock Exchange 
The Tokyo Stock Exchange was established on May 15, 1878, and is now the second 
largest stock exchange in the world. It has 2323 listed companies, and over US$4.5 
billion in total market capitalisation. The exchange for domestic stocks is divided into 
three sections: First Section; Second Section; and Mothers. Assignment rules to place 
listed stocks in each section are based on trading volume, number of shares listed, 
market capitalisation, et cetera. The sample stocks investigated in this paper are from 
the First Section, where the most actively traded stocks are listed. 
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The Tokyo Stock Exchange is a pure order-driven market with no designated market 
maker, where all liquidity is provided through a limit order book. Market mechanisms, 
including special quotes, maximum variation rule and price limits, are designed to slow 
down the trading process when a large order imbalance is expected, or present. In the 
TSE, the full order book is not accessible for normal traders and the hidden orders are 
not presented to traders, either. Only the five best prices are presented by the exchange5 . 
Special quotes, di sseminated by a saitori exchange member at their own discretion, are 
often seen to be indicators of buying (selling) interest in the market, which 
compensates for the lack of transparency and improves market liquidity. In the TSE, a 
saitori member undertakes the responsibilities of supervising trading processes, logging 
and matching orders, and also maintaining the limit order book. The Tokyo Stock 
Exchange uses price limits to prevent "wild swings" in daily price movements, and 
provide investors with a " time-out" period when big fluctuations occur (Tokyo Stock 
Exchange, 2006). Price limits are set as the maximum daily price variation in absolute 
yen value, dependant on stock prices6. Price limi ts also apply to special quotes. 
There are two trading sessions on the TSE: the morning session lasts from 9:00am until 
11 :00am, and the afternoon session lasts from 12:30pm until 3:00pm. Two transaction 
methods are used in off-hours trading and trading sessions; itayose and zaraba, 
respectively. The itayose method is used to decide opening and closing prices and 
5 Prior to June 2003, traders could only observe the three best trade prices. 
6 This feature is different from that where price limits are set at certain percentages in most exchanges that adopt 
this mechanism. We list the detailed price limits in Appendices; Table A2. 
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works by pooling all orders placed, without the time priority rule. The zaraba method 
is used in continuous trading, and works by matching pairs of buy and sell orders, 
following both of the time priority and price priority principles. All observations in the 
off-hours trading; that is, all trades under the itayose method; are excluded from our 
study sample. 
2.2 Data Description 
Firstly, we extract the historical daily data of 1695 stocks listed in the First Section of 
the TSE between 1996 and 2005 from Datastream. During this period, there are ups and 
downs in the market, but without extreme situations such as the 1990 market collapse, 
which was followed by severe stagnation 7. This ten-year period provides a sample pool 
of sufficient magnitude to ensure the general applicability of our results. It is worth 
noting that during the sample period, both tick size and price limits on the TSE changed 
(see Table lA and 2A for details). 
The raw data includes the daily high, the daily low and the closing price of each stock, 
along with daily trading volumes and the market capitalisation. The percentile statistics 
of year end closing prices (presented in Table 3A) show that the mean prices are much 
higher than the medians, suggesting the left skewness of price distribution on the TSE. 
90% of sample stocks are priced under ¥5000, and about 40% are priced under ¥500. 
7 We show the general trend in the market (1989 to 2005) by displaying the Nikkei 225 price index and its daily 
volatility, in monthly average (Figure I A). 
Price limits for stocks with a price between ¥100 and ¥500 vary from approximately 
16% to 50%. With a stock price between ¥500 and ¥5000, the limits vary from 10% to 
20%. This feature allows cheap stocks to be more volatile than high priced stocks. 
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We identify sample events as the occurrences of the limits being hit, by comparing the 
daily high, low and closing prices. There are 8390 occurrences of the upper limits being 
hit and 3355 occurrences of the lower limits being hit during the sample period, which 
construct our initial sample. As we can see from the summary statistics in Table 4A, 
downward price movements happen most frequently in the year 2000, due to the 
high-tech stock bubble burst after the first quarter, which caused a loss of 
approximately 30% on the Nikkei index. Overall, there are 1198 down-side events in 
that year. In the previous year, 1999, the Japanese stock market rose about 50%, due to 
booming of technology companies. As a result, the market saw the most upwards price 
movements in that year, with 2970 up-side events in total. 
Due to events occurring densely in 1999 and 2000, we use the trade-by-trade data of 
these two years to test order imbalance and the degree of information asymmetry in 
Section 3, thus our study of the high frequency data can be applicable for either bull or 
bear market periods. We obtain this data, which includes trading price, bid and ask 
quotes, and trading volume of the 1399 stocks that were most actively traded from 1999 
to 2000, from the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA). With 
no dealer or market maker in the TSE, we classify buy and sell orders according to the 
10 
following rules: If the mid-point of the bid-ask spread is greater than the trading price, 
then the trade is indicated as being seller-initiated, otherwise the trade is indicated as 
being buyer-initiated; If the mid quote is equal to the trading price, and if there is an 
up-tick from the previous trade, then the trade is identified as being buyer-initiated, 
otherwise the trade is identified as being seller-initiated. 
3. The Influence on Intraday Trading Activities and 
Information Asymmetry 
3.1 Order Imbalance Hypothesis 
From the perspective of regulators, price limits are partially designed to provide time 
for the market to absorb one-side heavy trading orders . However, as earlier noted by 
Lehmann (1989, p .207), price limits may " ... create a systematic order imbalance 
between patient and impatient traders", before and after the limits are hit. Therefore, it 
is important to investigate how price limits affect order imbalance based on broad 
observations of both directions of price movement. 
Following the methodology of Chan et al. (2005), we form two groups of stocks; the 
stocks with limit-hitting events into Stock1iii, and the stocks with prices changing over 
90% of the limits but without actually hitting the limits into Stocko.90 , during the 1999 
to 2000 period. We then identify the pre-hit period and the post-hit period of each event 
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for the purpose of comparison. Based on the event session So (defined as the trading 
session when the limit is hit), the pre limit-hit period S_1 starts from the previous trading 
session of S0 and runs until when the limit is first hit in S0 ; and the post period S+1 starts 
from the trade next to the limit-hitting trade in So and runs until the end of the next 
session after S0. This definition enables the inclusion of all the trade data, so that our 
comparison is more complete and, hence, more justifiable. We calculate the order 
imbalance ratio in the pre-hit period, by dividing the sum of buyer (seller) orders by the 
total trading volumes in that period for the upper (lower) limit-hit events. The same 
algorithm is then used for the post-period Stock,,,-,. We compute the order imbalance 
ratio for Stocko.9o using the same procedure. In order to avoid the bias that occurs when 
there are only few observations, we filter events with less than five trades in either S_1 
or S+1 from the sample. Due to this filtering, our sample of upper limit-hit events 
shrinks from 2084 to 1747, and the sample of Stocko.90. shrinks from 980 to 906, with 
the stock price moving upwards. In the circumstance that prices move downwards, the 
number of lower limit-hit events drops from 925 to 681, and from 507 to 448 for the 
events of Stocko.90-
Table l summarises the mean and median statistics of the order imbalance ratio. As we 
can see from the table, both Stock,,i, and Stocko.90 have fairly significant order 
imbalance in the pre-hit period, which is well above 50% where demand equals supply 
in the market. For upper events, the ratio of both groups decreases to a large extent in 
the post-hit period; approximately 14% for Stock,,i, and 19% for Stocko.90. Nonetheless, 
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the ratio of Stock1r;1 stands at around 57% in the post-hit period, which means that order 
imbalance still exists for this group. The imbalance is better alleviated for Stocko.90, 
with the ratio slightly over 50% in the post-hit period. The ratio reversal does not occur 
in either group. As for the lower events, the decrement on the order imbalance ratio is 
19% for Stock1r;1, and 23% for Stock0_90, which are both larger than for the upper events. 
The ratio is lower than 50% for both groups in the post-hit period. The order imbalance 
ratios for both groups experience reversal from the pre-hit period to the post-hit period 
with lower limit-hit events, but stay above 0.50 in the post-hit period with upper events. 
Thus, no substantial difference exists between Stock1r;1 and Stocko.90 in this result, 
suggesting that no particular magnet effect exists for group Stock1r;1, as found by Chan 
et al. (2005). 
[Insert Table l here] 
Apart from this result, because of the constraints from the price limits, some of the 
prevailing orders of the Stock1r;1 group cannot be executed after limit-hit moments, 
which differs from the case where all trading orders of Stock0_90 are executed from the 
pre-hit to the post-hit period. Table 1 shows, however, that the order imbalance ratio 
decreases largely for Stock1r;1 in the post-hit period with both the upper and lower 
events. This suggests that price limits effectively lower the order imbalance ratio after 
limit-hitting, and that this effect is more significant in the case of lower limit-hit events. 
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In order to incorporate the influence from other factors on the order imbalance ratio and 
examine whether the decrement is specifically related to limit-hit, we use a similar 
cross-section regression to that used by Chan et al. (2005), with some different 
variables. The dependent variable (the change in the order imbalance ratio) is defined 
as: 
~IMBAL1 = IMBALj,post - IMBALj,pre, 
where IMBALJ,pasc stands for the order imbalance ratio in the post-hit period and 
IMBALJ,pre stands for the ratio in the pre-hit period for a certain event). The regression 
function is constructed as follows: 
+ ~6*Volatility1 + EJ, (1) 
where: LHG is the dummy variable, and equals l if stock) comes from the Stock1,;1 
group and 0 if stock} comes from the Stocko.9o group; MktCap1 denotes the logarithm of 
stockj's market capitalisation; ~Volume1 is computed as the logarithm change on the 
trading volume from the pre-hit period to the post-hit period with stock}; Volatility1 is 
computed as the squared logarithm return between the closing price of the post-hit 
period and the opening price of the pre-hit period; Weekday1 and Month1 refer to the 
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day of the week and the month when eventj happens; and f-J is the error term, on which 
heteroskedasticity is taken into consideration if there is some pattern in the error term. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Table 2 presents the results from the cross-section regression. The coefficients for the 
dummy variable LHG, of both upper events and lower events, are significantly positive, 
which implies that the change in the order imbalance ratio on Stock1,11 is not larger than 
for Stock0.90. We can conclude that there is a smaller decrease in the order imbalance 
ratio for both upper and lower limit-hit events, and that the ratio reversal on lower 
events from the pre-hit to post-hit period is not entirely associated with price limits. 
This result is inconsistent with the findings of Chan et al. (2005) on the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange. In their study they discover that the coefficient for variable LHG is 
significantly negative to the dependent variable 6IMBAL. 
3.2 Information Asymmetry Hypothesis 
Now we examine the degree of information asymmetry surrounding limit-hit events. 
Ahn, Cai, Hamao and Ho (2002, p.403 - p.404) argue that it is possible that price limits 
" ... would reduce the amount of information asymmetry" in the market when the price 
discovery process is slowed down. The previous test on the order imbalance ratio is not 
able to explain to what extent price limits may also affect price transmission at the time 
when part of the one-side orders are suppressed. Therefore, it is necessary to extract 
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information content from the transaction data by decomposing the bid-ask spread 
before and after the limit-hit moment, so that we can have an implicit understanding of 
the extent to which price limits influence informed trading. 
Kim and Sweeney (2002), contend that informed traders with private information put 
off their orders during limit-hitting sessions until price ranges are revised in subsequent 
trading days, so that they may obtain higher profits from trading. Kim and Sweeney 
(2002) study the distribution of closing prices, price continuations and reversals. Their 
argument is supported by their test results , which are based on daily data from the 
Taiwan Stock Exchange. One caveat of their study, however, is that they fail to 
consider the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread, which affects the 
decision of limit order traders who can be considered as liquidity providers in an 
order-driven market (Ahn et al., 2002) . As noted by Ma, Rao and Sears (1989) , it is 
difficult to evaluate price limit performance by only using daily data. It may be too 
early to imply the impact of price limits on informed traders without breaking down 
transaction price data. 
Based on the transaction data, we begin by testing the degree of information asymmetry 
before, and after the limits are hit. This is done by estimating the adverse selection cost 
under the following decomposition model, which is provided by Glosten and Harris 
(1988) and, from here on is referred to as the GH88 model: 
(2) 
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where: P 1 denotes the transaction price at time t; Q1 denotes the trading indicator of the 
trade at time t , which is valued at 1 with buyer-initiated orders and -1 otherwise; and q1 
is the trading size, which is uniformly measured in thousands of shares, as per the 
minimum trading unit8. The GH88 model defines the adverse selection component as zo 
+ z1q1; and the adverse selection cost, SYMM, as (zo + z1q1) I (zo + z1 q1 +co+ c1q1 ). We 
calculate the coefficients zo, z1, c0, and c1 of the GH88 model by using the price, trading 
volume and indicator seri als in both pre- and post-hit periods, for each event. Then we 
calculate SYMM ratios for the pre and post periods based on the corresponding 
coefficients and q1, which is now defined as the median trading volume. In order to 
avoid influence on our estimation from the extreme trading size, we exclude trades with 
volumes larger than the 99th percentile, or smaller than the 1st percentile, from the 
actual computation of each event during the pre- and post-hit periods. 
The means and medians of the SYMM ratio from the pre- and post-hit periods are 
presented in Table 3. For events with prices moving up, the mean SYMM ratios of 
Stock1,;1 and Stocko.9o in the pre-hit period are 0.4244 and 0.4314, respectively, 
correspondingly higher than 0.3691 and 0.4199, respectively, in the post-hit period. 
The reduction for Stock1,;1 is slightly larger than that for Stocko.90. As for events with 
decreasing prices, the mean SYMM of Stock11;1 is 0.4336 in the pre limit-hit period, 
dropping to 0.4087 in the post-hit period, while the ratio increases on Stock0_90, from 
8 In lhe TSE, lhe trading unit varies between different companies, but over half of listed companies in lhe First 
Section use a trading unit of I 000 shares (e.g., 9 17 of a total 1595 companies in the First Section use l000 shares as 
a trading unit by the end of2004 (Tokyo Stock Exchange, April 22, 2005). 
0.4039 to 0.4440. Medians of SYMM ratios for both groups show a similar pattern. 
Therefore, this result supports the proposition of Ahn et al. (2002), that price limits 
reduce information asymmetry on the TSE. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
17 
To confirm that the decrement in information asymmetry is specifically associated with 
limit-hit events, we construct the cross-section regression below: 
(3) 
where ~SYMM1denotes the change on the SYMM ratio between the pre- and post-hit 
period for event} (~SYMM1 = SYMMJ,posr - SYMMJ,pre), with all other variables being 
defined as in Equation (1). If the coefficient of variable LHG is shown to be negative, 
we can assume that the improvement on information asymmetry is more significant 
with the imposition of price limits. 
Table 4 summarises the regression results. The coefficients of variable LHG for the 
upper and lower events are -0.0373 and -0.0612, respectively; which are both negative 
at the 5% and l % levels of significance, respectively. The result suggests that price 
limits in the TSE contribute to the improvement of information asymmetry, which is 
again inconsistent with the conclusion of Chan et al. (2005) on the KLSE. Table 4 also 
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shows that the coefficients of variable~ Volume are significantly positive for both 
upper and lower events. This implies that the magnitude of the change in the degree of 
information asymmetry is negatively related to the change on trading volume. The 
decrement in information asymmetry increases when the change in trading volume 
decreases, and vice versa. This is consistent with the finding of Ahn et al. (2002), that 
the adverse selection component increases with larger trade sizes on the TSE. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
So far, we discover that price limits help to correct order imbalance and lower the 
adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread. Price variations are strongly 
associated with the order imbalance between buyer- and seller-initiated orders (Kyle, 
1985; Spiegel and Subrahmanyam, 1995). Also, considering the close relationship 
between information transmission and the price discovery process, it is necessary to 
examine the daily volatility and price behaviours, which may also provide a good 
foundation to compare our findings with other studies which also focus on daily data. 
4. The Influence on the Daily Price Volatility and Trading 
Activities 
